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IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, a corporation,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 8785

STRU·CTURAL 'STEEL &
FORGE CO., a corporation,

Defendant and Appellant
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
'STATEMENT OF POINITS
POIN'T I.
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE UNITED
STATE'S CONSTITU'TION DOES NOT CREA'TE CONCURREN'T JURISDI CTIO·N IN THE INTERSTATE
COMMERCE COMMISSION OVER THESE CASES.
POIN'T II.
THE IN'TERS'TATE ·CO·MMERCE COMMISSION
HA'S NO 'JURISDI-C'TION OVER ,THE APPE,LLANT.
POIN'T III.
THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMIS'SIO·N
DOE S NOT HAVE PRIMARY JURISDIICTION OVER
THE SUBJECT MA'TTER.
1

1
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POINT IV.
REFERRAL TO 'THE INTER'S'TATE C'OMMERCE
COMMISSION IS BARRED BY 'THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS.
POIN'T V .
.ft~SSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE IN'TERSTATE
COMMER,CE COMMIBSrON DOES HAVE EXCLUSIVE
PRIMARY JURISDIC'TION, THEN THE 'TRIAL ·COURT
SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED 'THESE CASES.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Respondent in its brief has raised new matter
to which this reply brief is addressed.
POINT I.
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE UNITED
STATE'S CONSTITUTION DOES NOT CREATE CONC'URRENT JURISDICTION IN THE INTER~TATE
C·OMMERCE COMMISSION OVER THESE CASES.

Appellant contends that before one even considers
whether the subject matter of these cases comes
within the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, it must
be shown that the administrative agency has jurisdiction over the parties concurrent with that of the
court which would make the referral.
The Railroad concedes that there is no statute
allowing it to initiate an original proceeding in
these cases 'before the Interstate Comn1erce Commission ( Respdt's br. p. 18) but it seems to find
concurrent jurisdiction in the Interstate Commerce
Commission merely because these cases involve
questions dealing with interstate commerce
(Respdt's br. p. 16). The Railroad contends that the
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source of the original state court jurisdiction in
these cases is not the state Constitution, but is created through the beneficence of ~gress in it,s
exclusive right to regulate interstate commerce.
(Re-s pdt's br. p. 29). ~ For_thJ.~ ,r~~§on ,,1h~~RIDJr.9e~
contend~ __
tha.t _jurisdiction __of the Interstate Comn1erce ComiJiission
.. J~-- _!1Qt only "primary" l>,~t _ "_e~::=:: ·· ·
~!~!~~:-~~<J~~~~pdt'.~:.J~.:r~, p . .!§};,,":,! his position is understandable, because the Railroad recognizes it
must find a jurisdictional basis for the Interstate
Commerce Commission to act in a case of this nature.
. .. .
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'The Railroad's argument on this point seems to
be tl1at it could have, if it had wished, commenced
these proceedings against defendant before the Interstate Commerce Commission, although it concedes
there is no statute authorizing this, because of the
bare bones of the commerce clause.
This contention is just not the law, as an elemental analysis of the workings of the FederalState system will show. ·These are a·ctions for money
due under contracts of carriage. Such actions from
time immemorial can be brought wherever the plaintiff can successfully obtain jurisdiction over defendant. In this case plaintiff succeeded in obtaining
jurisdiction over the defendant in the state courts
of Utah. The Interstate 'Commerce Act made no
change at all in this state of affairs. In fact Section 22 of that Act expressly provided that nothing
3
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in the Act would abridge or alter rights then existing in common law. Certainly the Railroad cannot
contend that the commerce clause of the United
States Constitution vests in the Interstate Commerce Commission concurrent jurisdiction with the
State or Federal court of all matters merely because
they involve interstate commerce. This argument
J;educed to absurdity would vest in ihe CJ>mmissiQD
COfl:~~,~~~rit jurisdiction to de~~rmj~~ . . [ights in_j !1~-tions involving collisions of motor veh-icles which
are interstate carriers. It is true that the federal
judiciary has by development of the concept of primary jurisdiction limited the rights of all courts
'(State and Federal) in certain cases involving certain issues to decide these without prior recourse
to the Interstate Commerce Commission- but this
is a far ·different thing from contending that the
Interstate Commerce Act created a right in the
state courts.
'If£"?#
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Merely to restate the common law development
of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not
solve the question before this court, because these
questions are: ( 1) Do these cases involve the issues
generally considered su:bject to referral to the Interstate Commerce Commission? (2) Even if such
issues are present, can such a referral 'be made where
the Interstate Commerce Commission has no jurisdiction over the party objecting to the referral?
4
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'Stated differently, does the Interstate Commerce Commission have primary jurisdiction over
the subject matter involved here, and if so, does it
have jurisdiction over the persons?
POIN'T II.
THE IN'TERSTATE ·COMMERCE C'OMMISSION
HAS NO JURISDI·C'TION OVER 'THE APPE'LLANT.

Respondent contends that if Congress merely
repealed Section 22 of the Interstate Commerce Act,
Congress would "completely remove concurrent jurisdiction from state coutts in the field of interstate
commerce" (Respdt's br. p. 30) 'T·he matter is certainly not that simple. Respondent· cites P.ennsylvania R. Co. v. PuritJaxn Coal Min. Co., 23'7 U'S 121,
130, 35 Sup. ·ct. 484, '59 L. Ed 867 ( 1915), where the
United States ·Supreme Court, in discussing Section
22, stated that without this section '·'it might have
been claimed ~?~~~,_2.2pgress having entei"e!! the fi~ld,
tlie \vh'ole subject
of liability of carrier to shippers
---,.
,.,_ .,.,.
in
interstii'te"
commerce
had
been
withdrawn
from
"-. .
·._ .. _..-,.-..""""" ..
tfie___Jtrrisdictiol1~of~·tne state '"c6Urts, and this clause
was added to indicate that the commerce act, in
giving rights of action in Federa~ courts was not intended to deprive the state courts of their general
-·~
and concurrent jurisdiction." (emphasis added~irst,
of course Puritan ·Coal was an action where the
state cou;t was held to have properly exercised its
juridiction in not referring. Secondly it was an ac~-
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tion brought by a shipper against a carrier. The
problem was whether, when Section 9 of the Act
expressly gave the shipper alternative remedies to
bring such an action ·before either the Commission
or a federal court, the shipper could choose a third
alternative (i.e. the state courts). The Supreme
Court said that by reason of Section 2·2 it could.
There Section 9 and Section 2'2 construed together
were held to have preserved the jurisdiction of the
state court.
But the Act is completely silent about claims
by carrier against the shipper. In such a case Section 22 clearly indicates that the Railroad is relegated to its common law rights. The fact that Congress might have the power to compel state courts
to abdicate their common law jurisdiction in certain
fields is moot and academic. In reality, Congress
has not attempted to do so. As appellant pointed. out,
the powers of a state court are pre-empted by federal legislation only when the enactment in question
so states ( Applt's br. p. 20).
The very authorities cited by respondent show
that the doctrine of prin1ary jurisdiction applies
only where the agency is vested with jurisdiction by
appropriate 'legislation.
Thus, respondent quotes a United ·states District Court in Washington as stating· "The substance
of the doctrine is that where by appropriate legisla6
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tion an administrative agency is vested with jurisdiction * * * ". (Respdt's br. p. 11, emphasis added,
quoting from Ellison v. R~ayonier, Inc. 156 F. 'Supp.
214 (W.D. Wash. 1957) ). ~n~ll~t_G~~-~ the .<!~ten
dant llad_moved m.dismiss claiming that the Washington Water Pollution Control Act had vested _in
~he~-~2~l.'l!i9!1. ,...Q()~tr<?·!,.. Commission. primary_ juris-.
diction to determine stand.ards_of actionable.. pollu-:
tion of state
-· waters. The statutes cited in the dec_ision s:b.:QW_ that the Com111ission _was expressly_ given
pO,Y.f_r to control and prevent pollution and to adopt
ru_les, _r~g_11lations and standards, and g~ve it the
pow~r- to_ n1ake determinations. There can be no
question but that the Commission there had express
jurisdiction over an alleged polluter.
~-·

-..-,_:

~~

-~....,.-~~:..

,.

The Railroad appears to contend that because
courts have restricted their jurisdiction over certain
subject n1atter in cases where 'the Interstate Commerce Commission was given (by express act of
Congress) concurrent jurisdiction over the person
requesting a referral, whenever such subject
matter is involved 'the Interstate Commerce Commission has "exclusive" jurisdiction over the parties
as well. This is a non sequitur. A trial court might
well feel that a complex question of international
law before it would more properly be subject matter
to be submitted 'to the International Court of Justice
at the Hague and the Justices there migh't relish
7
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the opportunity to be of assistance. But unless there
were jurisdictional grounds by which a party could
be compelled to appear before that court (or both
parties submitted to that jurisdiction) a court order
sending them there would \be a nullity.
Respondent has failed to cite one case where
a state court has referred a matter to a federal
administrative agency over the objection of the defendant shipper. It cites a very recent United States
District ~court decision where the judge in an opinion "hastily prepared without opportunity for contemplative consideration of language or exhaustive
review and citation of authorities" (United States
v. Canfield Driveaw~ay Co., 159 F. Supp. 448 at 449,
(E.D. Mich., S.D. 1958)) at least shows awareness
of the dilemma he 'is in.
He states:
''In this case, however, it is the carrier
whose charges have been paid in full, who
insists that a reference be made. The court
cannot find a spelling out of procedure wh-ereby a carrier situated as the defendant in this
case, would initiate a proceeding before the_
Interstate Commerce Commissio11. I do not
find any decided case in which tl1e application
of the doctrine of prin1ary jurisdiction applies,
wi'th the procedural background of the case at
Bar." Id., at 455.
He further s'tates:
1

"Ordinarily, such an investig·ation would
8
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have its beginning in a complaint by a shipper
claiming to have been overcharged. In the
case of United St'mtes v. Western Pacific and
United States v. Ches,ape,ake & Ohio R. ~Co.,
the party seeking a referral was the shipper,
the Uni'ted States Government. In the case at
Bar, the party seeking for a referral is the
carrier, who in this litigation claims its
charges were valid. No case has been ci'ted
to the Court wherein the precise procedure to
be employed in making such a referral is announced. However, inasmuch as defendant is
here asking for such a referral, the burden of
initiating the procedure to invoke the aid of
the Interstate Commerce ·Commission would
be upon it." Id., at 456.
The floundering of the learned trial judge where
he was admittedly acting without precedent, is hardly clear or convincing authority for the propriety
of his action. Moreover, this was a case where the
defendant, not 'the party instituting the original
action, asked for the referral. 'The only other case
cited !by respondent on this point is Northern Pac.
Ry. 'Co. v. United States, 213 F. 2d 366, ( CCA-8,
1954) where the question of the federal ·court's jurisdictional power to refer is not even discussed.
A more recent case not cited 'by respondent is
New York, Susquehanna & W.estern R. Co. v.
Follmer, 254 F. 2d 510, (CCA-3, 1958). 'This was
an action between two carriers dealing wi'th division of receipts from joint through rates established
by agreement. The defendant carrier requested and
9
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obtained referral to the Interstate Commerce Commission. /The United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit reversed the trial judge and ordered
the order of referral vacated. In that case the carrier
objecting to referral cited the opinion of Mr. Justice
Jackson wherein he said:
''If the court is presented with a case it
can decide but some issue is within the competence of an administrative body, in an independent proceeding, to decide, comity and
avoidance of conflict as well as other considerations make it proper to refer that issue. But
we know of no case where the court has ordered r.efer:ence of an issue which the ttdministrative body would not itself have jurisdiction w
determine in a proceeding for that purpose."
Montana-Dakota Utilities Co., v. Northwestern Publ. Serv. ·Co. 341 US 246, 254, 71 Sup.
Ct. 692, 696, 95 L. Ed. 912 (1951). (emphasis added)
As the carrier seeking referral, according to the
court, had '''come up with some ingenious arguments
in support of a view that the Commission does have
original jurisdiction in these matters'' the court
preferred not to rest its decision upon this ground.
I d.
But if this court does find that the commerce
clause of the United States Constitution does not, of
itself, give the Interstate Commerce Commission
original juris-diction of these cases (this being the
sole argument upon which the railroad relies for
10
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such jurisdiction) then it should follow the conclusion of Mr. Justice Jackson and hold referral improper.
If the commission had no concurrent initial
jurisdiction then the sole basis for a referral would
be as an accommodation to the Utah court, analogous
to the situation of referral to a master. The Appellant in its original brief discussed at length the undesirability of, and inability of the state court to
make, such referral on this ground. It is significant
to note that the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in the Follmer case supra agreed wi'th appellant's analogy 'to the case of referral to a master.
That ·court discusses LaBuy v. Howes £,eather Co.,
352 US 249, 77 Sup. Ct. 309, 1 L. Ed. '2d 2·90 ( 1957),
and then says :
"'That case also emphasizes strongly the
point of view that references to masterships,
although provided for by the federal rules,
should be very sparingly used by district
judges. ·see Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. rule
53 (b), 28 U;S.C. See also United States v.
Kirkpatrick, 3 Cir., 1951, 186 F.2d 393. We
believe that the same attitude should be taken
towards referrals to administrative agencies."
POIN'T III.
'THE IN·TERS·T~T'E COMMERCE COMMISSIO·N
DOE'S N·OT HAVE PRIMARY JURISDI'CTION ·OVER
'THE S·UBJECT MA'T'TER.

Respondent inserted as an appendix the tariff
in dispute in this action, as if to ask whe'ther any
11
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judge in his right mind would want to wrestle with
such a verbal monster.
The railroad contends that because some of the
words in this monstrosity have a "peculiar meaning"
that for this reason alone the matter should be referred to the Interstate Commerce Commission. This
contention completely ignores the holding of the
United States ·supreme Court in the Western Pacific
case, which is the latest and most definitive development of the doctrine. There the court said:
''We say merely that where, as here, th£
problem of cost-allocation is relevent, and
where therefore the questions of construction
and reasonableness are so intertwined that
the same factors are determinative on both
issues, that it is the Commission which must
first pass on them". United States v. Western
Pac. R. Co., 352 u·s 59, 69, 77 Sup. Ct. 161,
1 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1956) (emphasis added).
This is 'the ratio decidendi of that case. There
is no statement here as to words with a "peculiar
meaning''. Courts decide contract actions where
words have "peculiar meanings" every day of the
year. If a railroad could always avoid judicial construction of its tariffs 'by merely inserting words
with a "peculiar meaning" tariffs would rapidly
assume even greater incomprehensibility than they
do now. 'This would be an invitation to obfuscation.
In fact the Follmer opinion is helpful here. 'That
Court of Appeals stated:
12
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'''This second issue seems to us to be a
question of construing the contract the parties
have made, deciding whether there has been
a breach and whether any rights have been
waived or otherwise lost. The terms used seem
to us to provide no more technical difficuTties
than a contract growing out of business in
the textile industry or the purchase and .sale
of produc'ts from a steel fabricating plant.
Their interpretation is not intermixed with
the peculiarly administrative function of determining the reasonability of rates charged.''
New York, Susq. & Western R. ·Co. v. Follmer,
supra, at 513.
The reasonableness of rates or questions of classification which are necessarily intertwined with
reasonableness of rates are matters for referral, as
the Western Racific case properly held. But the railroad appears to contend that any questions which
raise ''issues of transportation policy'' (Respdt's br.
p. 36) should be referred. If this is the law th~n why
the tortuous route that the United States Supreme
Court has wended, carefully trying to fit each case
into the pigeonhole of either Merchants Elev~ator or
Ameriuan Tie? Both lines of authority involve ''issues of transportation policy". But 'the test is not
such vagueness. It is whether the interpretation of
the tariff involves problems of cost-allocation. ·The
record here is utterly devoid of any evidence that
'the issues in these cases involve problems of costallocation.
13
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POINT IV.
REFERRAL TO THE INTERiS'TATE COMMER'CE
COMMlSSION IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS.

The railroad raises the question of the possible
bar of a referral by the Statute of Limitations.
( Respdt' s hr. p. 34-35) . This issue was raised in
the Western Pacific case, the Supreme Court pointing out tha't ·section 16 (3) (a) of the Interstate
Commerce Act "makes it clear that where a carrier
sues a private shipper, the action must be brought
within two years". United States v. Western Pac.
R. Co., supra, at 70. But, that court points out, as
the shipper in that case was the United States, the
six year statute of the Tucker Act would apply
(which statute would not be applicable here). The
Court held 'that the suits themselves were timely
brought and addressed itself to the question of the
effect of 'the statute on a referral.
~The

Supreme Court is then faced with several
cases construing Section 16 ( 3) as ''jurisdictional".
( I't should be recalled that in Western Pacific it was
the government, the shipper-defendant, who requested the referral.) The court distinguished them as
follows:
"The teaching of the Midstate Case (Midstate Horticultural Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co.
320 U'S 356, 88 L. Ed. 96, 64 S. Ct. 128) for
instance, is that the running of the statute
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destroys the right to affirmative recovery as
well as the remedy, so the period of limitations cannot be waived hy the parties. But
here the government is not asserting a right
'to affirmative recovery. It is seeking only
to have adjudicated questions rais.ed by way
of defense." United States v. Western Pac. R.
Go., supr,a, at 7~2-73 (emphasis added).
The court next discusses Morrisdale Coal~Co. v.
Pe'f~nsylv1wnia R. Co., 230 U'S 304, 57 L. Ed. 1494,
33 Sup. Ct. 938 ( 1913), where a shipper sued a
carrier. The Court there held that the case raised
issues cognizable only by the Interstate Commerce
Commission. The court in W.estern Pacific then summarized the ruling in Morris~ale as follows :
''* * * the Court held that the statute
could not be evaded by filing suit in the District Court, rather than before the Commission, and then having the barred claim adjudicated by referral to the latter. In effect the
holding was that the plaintiff had evoked the
wrong tribunal, and that since lim1ta'tions
barred suit before the correct tribunal, no referral could be made to the latter." Uni.ted
States v. Western AQ)c. R. Co., supra at 73.
The court in Western Pacific dis'tinguis·hed
Morrisdale as not barring "referral of defenses
properly and timely brought". ld. The court then
said "We hold, therefore, that the limitation of Section 16 ('3) does not bar a reference to the Interstate Commerce Commission of questions raised by
w,ay of defens.e and within the Commission's primary
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jurisdiction, as were these questions relating to the
applica'ble tariff". Id., at 74. (emphasis added)
It is strongly urged that the facts by which the
Morrisdale case were distinguished in Western Pacific are not before this court. In the instant cases,
the railroad sought to commence its actions in the
Utah courts, in many instances only a few days
before the two year statute of limitations ran, as
shown from the face of the pleadings. Then over a
year after the cases were at issue the railroad-plaintiff decided to ask for referral. This clearly is not
a case of "reference to the Interstate Commerce
Commission of questions raised by way of defense".
These are questions which form the very basis of
its right of affirmative relief. The railroad by its
own characterization of the issues as being properly
within the Commission's primary exclusive jurisdiction, has conceded it chose the wrong forum. It cannot use the Utah court as an ins'trumentality to prevent the running of the applicable statute of limitations.
POINT V.
~SSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE INTERSTATE
COMMER,CE COMMISSION DOES HAVE EXCLUSIVE
PRIMARY JURISDIC'TION, THEN THE TRIAL COURT
SH'OULD HAVE DISMISSED THESE CASES.

The railroad contends that "once the determina'tion is made that the agency should make the decision of certain questions, its jurisdiction is exclusive"
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(Respdt's br. p. 16). Assuming arguendo the validity of the argument, then the trial court should
have dismissed the case.
A case cited by the railroad, although n~dt on
this point, bears directly on this issue. In United
States v. Appic,ell~a, 148 F. Supp. 457, (D., N.J.
1957), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
had vacated a judgment in favor of the government
in view of the deci8ion in Western Pacific. The question before the trial judge was whether the action
should be dismissed or retained pending referral.
The court made a thorough and helpful analysis
of the cases. It quoted from the American Tie case
where 'the court said "It results that error was committed by the court in declining to sustain the motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction and therefore it is our duty to reverse", Texas & Pacific Ry.
Co. v. Amerioan Tie and Timber Co., 2'34 US 138,
149, 34 Sup. Ct. 885, 58 L. Ed. 1255 (1914).
1

It qudted from United States v. Interstate Commerce Commissi'Jn 337 US 426, 4~37, 69 Sup. Ct.
1410,1417,93 L. Ed. 1451 (1949). "Butithasbeen
established doctrine since this Court's holding in
Texas & Pacific Ry. ~Co. v. Abilene Cotton & Oil Go.,
[citing] that a shipper cl(lnnot file a section 9 proceeding in a district court where his claim for damages necessarily involves a ques'tion of 'reasonable17
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. . '

.

ness' calling for exercise of the Commission s primary jurisdiction {emphasis supplied)''. The trial
Judge pointed out that in Far Eastern Conference
v. United States, 34·2 u~s 570, 72 Sup. Ct. 492, 96
L. Ed. 576 (1952), the Supreme Court held the complaint should be dismissed and not held in abeyance by the District Court.
The trial judge o·bserved that the government's
effort ·to have the court retain jurisdiction was based
upon a fear generated from the Western Pacific
case.
"In short, the United States realizes that
the statutory limitation on bringing a complaint to the Interstate Commerce Commission would 'bar recourse to that body. But this
is no reason for this court to retain a cause
over which it has no jurisdiction in the first
place. The motion to dismiss is granted",
United States v. Apicella, supra, at page 460.
The railroad seeks to avoid this dilemma by
con'tending that there are issues still within the general jurisdiction of the state court (respdt's br. p.
50). It cites for an example the awarding and enforcing of damages. But as the judge in the Apicella
case pointed out, the questions referred to the Interstate Commerce Commission are not clearly severable from the issue of liability for the alleged
charges. There would be no undercharge if the commission determined tha:t the defendant here was properly complying with the tariff.
18
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The possible running of a statute of limitations
is not grounds for a stay as the Apicella case shows.
Indeed the Western Pacific court must have agreed,
for it spent considerable space in its opinion pointing out that the statute did not bar reference of questions ra'ised in defense, a problem which could have
been easily overcome by merely staying proceeding
in the trial oourt pending referral, if it felt that
this would be possible.
1

An additional reason for dismissal becomes ap~
parent when respondent in its brief finally makes
clear its understanding of the procedure ~o be followed pursuant to the trial court's order. T'he railroad denies that the s'tate court ordered the Inter-~
state Commerce Commission to make a determination (Respdt's br. p. 34) * ·The railroad_ contends
that a determination by the commission "would
then be based on an independent petition by the
respondent for a declaratory order pursuant to ·section 5 (d) of the Administrative Procedure Act.''
But under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act review lies exclusive through the Federal
courts ( 5 US'CA § 1001 et seq.) .
Moreover by express federal statute, procedure
is established for en£orcemen't, injunction, annulment or setting aside of orders of the Interstate
*

Despite the fact that the order recites "it is further ?rde.red tha~
the Commission make such further report and determination ...
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Commerce Commission in the United States District Courts. As the United ·states Supreme ·Court
has stated, "Federal District Courts have exclusive
jurisdiction of suits to enjoin, set aside, annul or
, suspend an order of the commission. In such suits
the United States is an indispensable party." Seaboard Airline R. Co. v. Daniel, 3'33 u·s 118, 122, 92
L. Ed. 580,585,68 Sup. Ct. 426 (1948).
Thus it is clear that the matter is not as simple
as stated by the railroad (e.g. ''Thus both finding of
fact and conclusion of law would be returned to the
trial court") ('Respdt's :br. p. 48). Any review of the
Commission's finding must proceed through the
federal court system. This points up the dual incongruity of the railroad's argument. It seeks to have
issues resolved by a federal commission which has
no jurisdiction over defendants, and then asks that
the findings be returned to a state court which has
no jurisdiction to review them. These actions sl1ould
be dismissed in any event to allow defendants full
scope of review within the proper jurisdictional
system.
Respectfully submitted,
FABIAN, CLENDENIN, MABEY,
BILLING'S & STODDARD
By Albert J. Colton
CALVIN L. RAMPTON
Attorneys for Appellant
Structural Steel & Forge Co.
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